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Introduction
Manufacturing contracts in the automotive industry have served a canonical role in the economic theory of contract and bargaining. The famous
story of General Motors’ relationship with its supplier Fisher Body in the
1920s is a landmark illustration of the problem of contractual hold up, underlying a prominent theory of vertical integration and the nature of the
1
firm. The theoretical fascination with automotive procurement contracts is
well deserved. There may be no other merchant-to-merchant contractual
template that governs such fantastic economic stakes—hundreds of billions
* Professor of Law and Economics, University of Michigan. B.A. 1989, Hebrew University; LL.B. (Law) 1989, Hebrew University; LL.M. 1991, Harvard; Ph.D. (Economics) 1995,
Harvard; S.J.D. 1995, Harvard. —Ed.
** Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1956, Amherst College; J.D. 1962, University of Michigan. —Ed. We are grateful to many automotive officials who
agreed to be interviewed for this study, and especially to Margaret Baxter of OESA for coordinating
the suppliers’ survey. For helpful comments on early drafts, we thank the editors of the Michigan
Law Review, the participants at the “Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium at
the University of Michigan, and workshop participants at the universities of Texas and North Carolina, the Hebrew University, and Tel-Aviv University. Financial support from the Olin Center at the
University of Michigan Law School is gratefully acknowledged.
1. See Benjamin Klein, Hold-Up Problem, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 241 (Peter K. Newman ed., 1998); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford &
Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297 (1978).
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of dollars per year—and implemented through a process that involves almost no negotiation of the legal terms. Boilerplate rules these transactions.
There is a long line of law-and-economics scholarship studying the attributes of standard-form terms in contracts between sophisticated parties in
high-stakes transactions. One of the benchmark predictions in this literature
is that contractual terms have to be efficient if they are to be consistently
2
used by the parties. Any rent-seeking power that a party has should be
translated into a price advantage; it should not be used to dictate selfish but
inefficient performance terms. Further, since legal terms such as warranties
and remedies affect the costs borne by the parties, we expect that sophisticated parties will be “pricing” the terms and will be ready to redraft terms
that cost more than they save. A study of automobile contracts provides an
opportunity to test these predictions. These are transactions in which economic power is unevenly distributed; much dickering takes place over prices
and product design; but everything else is packed into boilerplate. Every
party reads the boilerplate and understands its legal effect and its economic
consequences. Do strong parties dictate efficient boilerplate and extract
rents through prices and other purely distributive clauses? Do they tailor
their terms to maximize their net gains from the transactions?
Moreover, automotive supply contracts are the paradigmatic long-term
relationships that require a great deal of relationship-specific investments in
the form of machinery, location of plants, and precontractual technology
research. As the economic literature predicts, the interdependence of suppliers (who must invest in specializing for their buyers’ needs) and buyers
(who need specialized parts from their suppliers) gives opportunities for
3
hold up. These dangers make the contracts the primary tool for deterring
hold up and encouraging investment. What are the contractual techniques
used to address the risk of hold up?
In answering these questions, we have taken a simple, almost naïve approach. We read and compared industry boilerplate contracts and talked to
lawyers who drafted these forms and to some non-lawyer industry participants. We provide a case study, but it yields some general insights. For
example, the boilerplate contract terms between the Original Equipment
Manufacturers (“OEMs”) and the tier-1 suppliers show how economic
power is translated into transactional advantage. From the contract terms,
we can identify ways the OEMs extract value from their suppliers. Contrary
to the fabled GM–Fisher Body story, we find no real problem of hold up by
suppliers. The claim that suppliers with a long-term contract can hold up the
OEMs is based on a misunderstanding of the terms of the deal, the rules of
contract law, and the structure of the market. Moreover, comparing the terms
that appear in the purchase orders of the various OEMs reveals ways in
2. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 1–39 (1991); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the
Limits of Contract Law, 113 Yale L. J. 541, 545–46 (2003) (sophisticated firms are expected to
write contracts that maximize efficiency).
3. Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 7 (1995); Oliver Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 114–15 (1985).
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which they differ and, surprisingly, it suggests that some of these terms may
foster inefficiency. Finally, studying the way the form contracts are drafted
gives a detailed understanding of how and when tailoring of terms takes
place and how internal organizational features are harnessed to affect the
outcome of negotiations over contract terms.
The study of contracting in the automotive industry also provides an opportunity to investigate the design of contracts in an industry that deals with
fascinating economic changes. One major change has to do with the organization of production. By 1960, Ford was making almost everything from
floor mats to steel within the company, and the other OEMs had a nearly
4
equal degree of vertical integration. But since the early 1980s, the trend
5
toward vertical integration has reversed. The biggest American OEM, General Motors, which used to produce up to seventy percent of its parts
internally, is now only thirty-percent integrated. OEMs have shed whole
6
7
divisions, most notably Delphi and Visteon, and have started to buy large
subassemblies such as consoles, brake assemblies, and even frames from
outside suppliers. With the business changing so vastly, have contracts
changed as well?
Another major change in the automotive industry is its profitability.
American OEMs lose money; this is no secret. Ford and General Motors,
two bastions of American industrial power, issue debt that is graded as
8
junk. Since the OEMs are limited in their ability to renegotiate with their
9
most burdensome creditors —their current and retired employees—they
have turned to their suppliers. The drive to save money by paying suppliers
less that began in the mid-1980s has accelerated, and as these suppliers are
pressed, the pressure cascades down the supply chain. This study traces the
cascade of the contract terms that suppliers are required to accept.
The automotive supply industry is sometimes described as a pyramid built
in “tiers.” At the top are the OEMs. This Article focuses mostly on the “Big
Three” OEMs—General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler—but it looks
also at six foreign OEMs who assemble cars in the U.S. and who are a growing force in the American manufacturing market. Directly below the OEMs
are the “tier-1” suppliers—anyone who sells directly to an OEM. These companies usually sell sophisticated assemblies or parts, and most of them
specialize in designing and manufacturing automotive-specific products. They

4. See Christoph Scherrer, Governance of the Automobile Industry: The Transformation of
Labor and Supplier Relations, in Governance of the American Economy 209, 217–18 (John L.
Campbell et al. eds., 1991).
5.

See id. at 220.

6. Dale Buss, Perfect Storm: The Fate of U.S. Manufacturing Lies in the Hands of CEOs
like Delphi’s J.T. Battenberg, Chief Executive, Oct. 2004, at 38.
7.

Robert Barker, Visteon: What’s that Funny Noise?, Bus. Wk., July 3, 2000, at 159.

8. Jamie Butters, Reasons for Junk Ratings: Downgraded GM, Ford Must Shrink, S&P
Analyst Says, Detroit Free Press, May 7, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 22438709 .
9. Jeff Green, General Motors Comes Up Short in First Quarter, Seattle Times, Apr. 20,
2005, at E2; Eric Mayne, Ford May Cut Factory Jobs Next, Detroit News, June 23, 2005, at 1.
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purchase their supplies from “tier-2” suppliers, who in turn purchase from
“tier-3” suppliers, and so on. Since there are only a few OEMs at the top but
10
roughly six hundred to eight hundred tier-1 suppliers, a pyramid is an inaccurate metaphor. The metaphor is important, as we will explain below. The
main issues that need to be governed by the contracts between OEMs and
tier-1 suppliers are different than in lower tiers. Some of that difference will
be attributed to the fact that there is a much smaller set of potential buyers
above tier-1 sellers than there is above sellers in the lower tiers.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I compares the terms and conditions in the purchase orders of the OEMs and highlights important
differences in the substance of these boilerplate provisions. It argues that
these differences cannot be easily reconciled with the prediction that sophisticated parties draft the most efficient boilerplate terms. Part II examines
how these forms are drafted, how their terms are negotiated, and how the
OEMs guard their terms from erosion. It provides some insight on how tailoring occurs and how the internal organization of a party to a deal affects
the terms that this party can secure. Part III focuses on the role of economic
power. There, we examine how power is harnessed to administer and modify
contracts. This analysis revisits the claims made on the basis of the GM–
Fisher Body deal and argues that some of these claims are not valid. We
demonstrate the subtle ways in which hold up and renegotiation are curtailed. Finally, Part IV examines ways in which a less powerful party can
nevertheless get favorable contract terms.
I. The Contracts
Supply contracts in the automotive industry are made through competitive bidding. An OEM issues requests for quotations for a particular part or
assembly. The supplier whose bid is picked would ordinarily make a significant capital investment in R&D and production assets, and supply this part
for the duration of the car model in which the part is assembled, a period
that normally lasts four to eight years. The winning bidder, however, does
not always get the security of a long-term, fixed-price contract. While some
OEMs accord the supplier a long-term sourcing commitment, the actual
11
purchase orders are issued on a short-term basis. Shorter contracts give the
parties opportunities to renegotiate aspects of the deal like price and quantity estimates; OEMs commonly demand (and receive) price reductions
12
every year. Technically, most of these adjustments are not modifications of
the contract but rather renewals of short-term purchase orders (“POs”), all
entered into under a master long-term agreement.

10.

Auto Industry M&A Value Soars, Auto Beat Daily, Nov. 12, 2003, at 1.

11. Original Equip. Suppliers Ass’n, OEM North American Production P.O. Contract Terms and Conditions Comparative Analysis 15 (2004) [hereinafter OESA Analysis].
12. Patricia Panchak, Supplier Partnerships Provide a Competitive Edge, Indus. Wk., Sept.
2004, at 9.
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The contracts we looked at are the boilerplate POs governing the actual
supply agreements. While there is some interest in the long-term master
agreements, their language is usually brief and subordinates them to the
terms of the shorter-duration POs. The OEMs draft and issue these forms
through a process that will be described in Section II. Each OEM has a single form, titled either “Global Terms” or “General Terms,” that is used
almost without exception for procuring all of the manufacturing parts. General Motors, for example, enters into roughly one million procurement
contracts every year, at a total amount in excess of $80 billion—all governed
13
by a single contract form containing thirty-one paragraphs, translated into
six languages. In terms of economic stakes, this form may be the single
most important commercial contractual document ever drafted. In the remainder of this section, we compare the standard forms of the North
14
American OEMs.
Before we started this study, our conjecture was that we would find
similar boilerplate language throughout this industry. Influenced by the economic theory of standard-form contracts, we expected these contracts
between ultra-sophisticated parties to include efficient arrangements. Surely
the OEMs have significant bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers; but
economic theory teaches us that it would be wise to use this power in extracting more favorable bottom-line prices, not by extracting inefficient,
15
one-sided legal terms. Moreover, our expectation that the forms would be
uniform throughout the industry was influenced by the fact that they are all
issued in a highly repetitive fashion to the same group of tier-1 suppliers—
those very large manufacturing companies that supply the main parts and
assemblies to the OEMs. These are sophisticated counterparties who read
the contracts and assess the costs of the terms. OEMs cannot “sneak in” inefficient terms that would go unnoticed. Further, a uniform format, we
expected, would minimize drafting costs: why draft a new form if your competitor already produced one? More importantly, it would also be consistent
with learning externalities: why start with a fresh form when there is already
much experience in interpreting and relying on familiar language in existing
forms? Finally, uniform templates would generate network externalities, by
making it easier to predict costs (e.g., of warranty terms) in order to com16
pare bids across companies and to price individual terms. In sum, based on

13.

General Motors General Terms and Conditions (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors).

14. Some of the contracts were given to us with the understanding that they will not be
posted publicly. We shared the contracts with the Michigan Law Review editors for cite checking. In
the event that we receive clearance from our interviewees to post the contracts, they will be available
through a Web link at www.umich.edu/~omri.
15. Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361 (1991); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 Va. L. Rev. 1053 (1977).
16. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting, 83 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporate Law and Networks of Economic Effects, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995).
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17

observations about other industries, we expected little variation in the
OEMs’ forms.
What we found was a different reality. There is significant variance
across the OEM contracts. We examined the boilerplates of nine North
18
American OEMs and recorded the many ways in which they differ. These
differences were also confirmed in discussions with representatives of tier-1
suppliers and of the suppliers’ trade association, who emphasized that the
differences in the legal terms represent in some cases significant variations
in the economic consequences of the deals. While the variation of terms
itself may indicate that some of these terms are inefficient, our analysis focuses on the content of the terms. We attempt to understand and explain
their business logic and examine whether they are likely to maximize the
joint surplus.
According to all of our interviewees, the most important issues in the
OEM boilerplate contracts are the following: termination rights, warranties
and remedies, tooling (the ownership of the production assets), intellectual
property rights in technological innovations, and service parts. Consider
each of these issues.
Termination. In all purchase contracts, OEMs secure the right unilater19
ally to terminate the agreement. This right to terminate, which is not
available to suppliers, is almost unrestricted. Either for no cause at all, or for
reasons stated ambiguously as “competitiveness of price and quality,” the
OEMs can, with short notice, terminate the contract. In fact, the cancellation
rights are so one-sided that they might render the contracts unenforceable on
the ground that they lack consideration or fail to state a quantity term under
20
the statute of frauds. There is variation among OEMs’ forms regarding the
17. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 Emory L.J. 929, 939 (2004).
18. The nine OEMs who assemble cars in North America are: General Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Hyundai, VW, and BMW.
19. See, e.g., General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 13 (Sept. 2004) (on file with
authors); Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions § 27 (Jan.
2004) (on file with authors); DaimlerChrysler Production Purchasing General Terms and Conditions
§ 20 (May 2003) (on file with authors).
20. Ford’s contract says: “27.01 Termination. The Buyer may terminate the Purchase Order,
in whole or in part, at any time and for any or no reason, upon Written Notice to the Supplier. The
Supplier may not terminate at its option.” This term replaced an earlier termination clause that required a thirty-day notice. Similarly, General Motors’s contract gives it the right to cancel the
transaction within thirty days if the supplier cannot match the rivals’ lower cost or competitive technology, design, or quality. These provisions come close to rendering the contracts illusory. Still, the
requirement of a written notice in Ford’s contract, and of a thirty-day notice in GM’s contract, may
constitute the necessary restriction to render these contracts enforceable. See, e.g., Williston, Law
of Contracts § 105, at 418–19 (3d ed. 1957). The termination term may also create a problem
under the statute of frauds. Courts that have adjudicated similar provisions in lower-tier cases and
one recent OEM–tier-1 case have held the contracts to be unenforceable. See, e.g., Dedoes Indus., v.
Target Steel, No. 254413, 2005 WL 1224700 (Mich. Ct. App. May 24, 2005) (holding that a price
quote in which seller promises to supply buyer’s steel requirements for the next three years does not
satisfy the quantity provision of the statute of frauds); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Steel Dynamics, No.
CR-04-056983-CK (Cir. Ct. Oakland County, Mich. Aug. 4, 2004) (holding that GM’s award letter
confirming the purchase of approximately 70,000 metric tons of steel did not satisfy statute of
frauds because it contained only an approximate quantity, not a guaranteed purchase).
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payments to which suppliers are entitled upon termination. While all OEMs
provide some recovery to suppliers for their squandered investments, some
are stingy—they pay only for finished parts, work in progress, and raw ma21
terials. Others are more generous: they will pay for a combination of other
termination costs, such as suppliers’ obligations to their own subcontractors
22
and investments in capital. None of the OEMs cover suppliers’ unamortized investment in R&D and engineering—a great source of agony for
suppliers who expect to cover their fixed costs only after several years of
supply. Indeed, as we note below, OEMs recognize the potential unfairness
of a sudden termination and are willing to grant ad hoc accommodations
23
that go beyond their legal responsibility.
It is difficult to identify the exact inefficiency that broad termination
rights create, particularly since it is not clear how often these rights are exercised. Still, contracts containing harsh termination terms represent a defacto transformation of the long-term commitment into a series of shortterm agreements. In this reality, suppliers anticipate pressures from OEMs
to reduce prices even after they have been awarded a contract. This creates a
risk of hold up by OEMs—“reduce your price or be terminated”—that
makes relationship-specific investments less valuable.
Warranties and Remedies. Warranty provisions are important legal terms
for they determine suppliers’ liability for design defects, intellectual property infringements, and the cost of precautionary recalls. OEMs specify
what fraction of the total liability bill would be borne by suppliers and grant
themselves rights to setoff warranty charges against payments owed to sup24
pliers. When an OEM finds itself liable for a design problem, there may be
a genuine dispute as to whether the problem originates from a defective part
for which the supplier is liable, or from faulty integration of the part by the
OEM. Anticipating such disputes, OEMs include standard clauses that grant
them self-help power to recover from the supplier. GM’s rights to recover

21. See, e.g., Daimler Chrysler Production Purchasing General Terms and Conditions § 20
(May 2003) (on file with authors); General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 13 (Sept. 2004)
(on file with authors).
22. See, e.g., Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions
§ 27.03 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors).
23. The willingness of parties to go beyond the boilerplate and to grant concessions that are
tailored ad hoc to the needs of their counterparts is discussed in Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of
Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation
between Businesses and Consumers, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 857 (2006) and in Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827
(2006); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, Wis. L. Rev. 679,
704–07 (2004); Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 356, 358–60 (1980).
24. See, e.g., Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions
§ 11.01 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors) (“Buyer may set off and recoup against the Buyer’s accounts payable to the Supplier any amounts for which the Buyer determines in good faith the
Supplier is liable to it. . . . The Buyer may do so without notice to the Supplier.”); id. § 23.06 (“At its
option, the Buyer may debit the Supplier for up to 50% of the Actual Recall Costs . . . if the Buyer
has made a good faith determination that the Supplier is likely to be liable for some portion of the
total costs . . . .”).
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one hundred percent of the liability when it unilaterally decides that the
parts failed to conform to the warranty and to setoff the entire charge against
the supplier’s account are among the toughest. Ford stipulates that the supplier’s share of liability will be negotiated ex post but allows itself a
unilateral setoff, to be charged before such negotiation concludes, of up to
fifty percent of the cost. This setoff is against the amount owed by the supplier or by any of its more liquid affiliates and subsidiaries. Some
companies’ terms entitle them to make the liability apportionment without
the supplier being heard. Others provide that the parties will negotiate the
25
allocation of liability costs to reflect actual responsibility.
In practice, these variations in sharing-of-liability clauses reflect true
differences in the cost allocations, and, importantly, they enable different
systems for monitoring of defects. It appears that OEMs with the most selfserving warranty allocation terms are also those that take longest to detect
and resolve a defect. That is, they are the ones for whom the total costs of
defects are, on average, greater. One of our interviewees quoted the warranty cost per vehicle to be roughly $1000 for an American OEM that uses
26
the harshest warranty allocation terms, but only about $250 for a Japanese
27
OEM that applies a more balanced approach. Further, he pointed out that
the American OEM takes, on average, 180 days from the time of the first
indications of a parts defect until it is resolved; the Japanese OEM takes
28
only forty days. Of course, Japanese cars may simply be better built than
American cars. But other figures suggest that if there is quality gap, it is not
as significant as the gap in warranty costs. One way to measure intrinsic
quality is the average number of problems per one hundred vehicles. Toyota
and Honda, for example, reported in 2003 101 problems per one hundred
vehicles; GM, Chrysler, and Ford reported between 120 to 127 problems per
29
one hundred vehicles. This small quality gap is much smaller than the warranty-cost gap, in which an American OEM suffers a cost roughly four times
as high as that of the Japanese OEM.
25. Some of the lower-tier contracts we examined include an equally harsh warranty burden
on the supplier. For example, some large tier-1 manufacturers put a warranty burden of 100% on the
supplier in their own contracts with tier-2s. See, e.g., Delphi Corp. General Terms and Conditions
§ 7.3 (Mar. 2004) (on file with authors) (“If any goods are reasonably determined . . . to fail to conform to the warranties set forth in this Contract, Seller shall reimburse Buyer for all reasonable
losses, costs and damages caused by such nonconforming goods.”) (emphasis added). There is an
important difference, however, between the OEMs’ terms and the identical tier-1 terms. OEMs have
the power to actually impose almost any share of the liability on their suppliers; tier-1s, in contrast,
are more constrained, as they expect their suppliers to fight back.
26. Jane Spencer, The Best Car Deal Around: Never Paying for Repairs—New Longer Warranties Open Door to Car Hypochondriacs, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 2002, at D1.
27. Craig Fitzgerald, Getting Serious About Quality, Auto. Indus., July 2004, at 45. A
different source suggests that American OEMs spend on warranty claims between $537 to $628 per
vehicle, whereas Japanese vehicles average only $226 per vehicle sold in the United States. See
Auto Warranties, Warranty Week, January 27, 2004, http://www.warrantyweek.com/archive/
ww20040127.html.
28. Interview with Matthew Paroly, Managing Commercial Attorney, Delphi Corporation, in
Troy, Mich. (July 28, 2005).
29.

Fitzgerald, supra note 27.
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These figures are consistent with the prediction that parties who believe
that they can shift the cost of liability onto others would do less to reduce
this cost. Put differently, in situations in which joint precautions by both
supplier and buyer are necessary to prevent liability from mounting or in
which suppliers can efficiently cure a defect, it is not surprising that the allocation of greater liability to the supplier reduces the OEM’s need for a
30
quick solution to any quality issue. What is surprising is that not all contracts are designed to induce more participation of the suppliers in the
31
warranty process, and thus fail to achieve efficiency.
Service Parts. The arrangements governing service parts can be a source
of important profit for suppliers as well as a significant burden. Service
parts are sold in the retail market at a large premium. If the OEM alone may
sell these parts, the supplier is deprived of a share of potential profits. Moreover, if the supplier is obligated to supply the OEM’s requirements for these
parts for years after the model production ends (when it is expected that
volume efficiency, materials, and skilled personnel will no longer be available), the burden on the supplier can be large.
Almost all OEMs require the supplier to agree to supply service parts
for a period of ten to fifteen years after current-model production ends.
Some OEMs, however, share the surplus that this production will yield.
32
Honda and Toyota, for example, stipulate that the service part prices will
be negotiated by the parties when the time comes; that translates to a profitsharing deal. Others (for instance, GM) require prices to remain at their low,
33
production-phase price for an initial period, say three years, after which a
higher negotiated price would be agreed upon. Most harsh are terms that
require suppliers to commit to fifteen years of post-production supply and to
34
refrain from raising prices above the production-phase prices. These
30. It is interesting to compare the OEM’s warranty terms with those appearing in the boilerplate purchase contract drafted by the Verband der Automobilindustrie [German Association of the
Automotive Industry] (“VDA”), which applies to all procurement contracts in all tiers. The VDA’s
warranty and remedies provisions give the supplier a greater role in assessing any damage claim,
participating in repairs and replacements, and being consulted before any action is taken by the
buyer. The VDA’s terms also limit the duration of warranties, reduce their scope when the supplier is
not negligent, and allow a host of opportunities to cure. See Einkaufsbedingungen, [General Terms
and Conditions for the Purchase of Production Material and Spare Parts], Verband der Automobilindustrie (May 12, 2002) (on file with authors), English translation available at http://www.vda.de/
en/vda/intern/organisation/abteilungen/recht_01.html.
31. Similarly, OEMs draft broad indemnity terms entitling them to reimbursement of expenses for the legal defense of claims, such as products liability, for which the supplier will
ultimately be responsible. Suppliers are nervous about being unable to control or influence the litigation of such claims while at the same time being liable for damages and litigation costs.
32. See, e.g., Toyota Motors Manufacturing North America, Inc. Terms and Conditions
§ 4.2(d) (Oct. 1998) (on file with authors) (“[Toyota] will establish, after good faith negotiation with
Supplier, a price for Service Parts.”).
33. General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 20 (Sept. 2004) (on file with authors)
(“During the 15 year period after Buyer completes current model purchases, Seller will sell goods to
Buyer to fulfill Buyer’s past model service and replacement parts requirements. . . . [T]he price(s)
during the first 3 years of this period shall be those in effect at the conclusion of current model
purchases.”).
34.

See, e.g., Nissan North America, Inc. Master Purchase Agreement § 19 (2003).
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provisions were described by a tier-1 supplier as “cyanide pills”—leaving
the supplier with the high cost of maintaining a production line but without
the ability to recoup this expense through high volume of sales.
The service parts provisions are not only a matter of division of surplus;
they also have efficiency implications. When a car model is discontinued by
an OEM, the production volume of parts obviously declines substantially.
Maintaining the production line and the skilled labor to produce the parts
will be expensive. Pricing the parts based on the cost structure prevailing
when volume is much higher is a poor way to reflect the true wholesale economic price and may lead to suboptimal purchase decisions. For example,
supplier representatives complained about the OEMs’ reluctance to hold
minor inventories of parts and their tendency to make frequent small-volume
purchases; that requires the suppliers to “turn on the machines” repeatedly
to produce small, highly inefficient quantities of parts. Schemes that accord
the suppliers a greater share of the surplus might create incentives to reduce
these inefficiencies.
Intellectual Property. The production of assembly parts often requires
the development and application of new technologies that have high value as
intellectual property beyond that particular application. Much of this technology passes over to the OEMs in the course of designing the parts and
assembling them into the vehicles. The contracts grant the OEMs legal
rights in these valuable information assets, not only to use them in production but also to control other uses. Suppliers—particularly those for whom
the technology is the main asset—care greatly about this type of appropriation. Here, too, there is surprising variation in the scope of rights secured by
different OEMs. The most extreme position accords the OEMs unlimited
rights to all intellectual property of the supplier that is disclosed in the
35
course of trade, except for patents registered before the supply. Suppliers
also waive their trade secret protection, and assign to the OEMs all copyrightable works created under the contract without any royalty rights. These
rights are often for unlimited duration, extending beyond the termination of
the contract. The more restrained position of other OEMs limits the OEMs’
right to sublicense intellectual property and guarantees that the confidential
36
information of the supplier will not be disclosed.
As will be noted below, some suppliers refuse to grant such rights in
their intellectual property. Companies whose main business is information
technology (“IT”), such as the makers of software, are stubborn about this,
and OEMs have learned to expect that they will not be able to dictate their
terms to such suppliers. Indeed, some OEMs have specially drafted IT contracts that accommodate the expectations of their IT suppliers for more
balanced terms. Still, most production parts are supplied by manufacturing
35. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions §§ 16,
20.01 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors); Hyundai Motor Manufacturing General Terms and Conditions § 19 (undated) (on file with authors).
36. See, e.g., General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 14 (Sept. 2004) (on file with
authors); Nissan North America, Inc. Master Purchase Agreement § 15.2 (2003) (on file with authors).
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companies whose main business is not IT, and these suppliers were not able
to protect their investment in innovative technology as well as the IT suppliers do.
Since OEMs do not tailor their intellectual property terms specifically for
each supplier, the boilerplate can be a significant source of inefficiency. Suppliers that have the ability to develop new technologies, but who cannot enjoy
the full value of the technology they develop once appropriated by the OEM,
will have a weaker incentive to make investments. We can only speculate that
OEMs that insist on harsh IP terms end up with cars that incorporate fewer
technological advances. Some of the suppliers’ representatives suggested that
this is the case.
Tooling. The machinery and production assets used in manufacturing requires costly investments. When an OEM pays for these investments, the
contract establishes that the OEM owns the tooling and permits the supplier
to use the tooling to serve this OEM. The OEM contracts forbid commingling—the use of the tools for assembly of parts directed to other OEMs.
Thus, on termination, OEMs can haul away the tooling and even charge the
supplier with some of the costs of shipping.
Representatives of tier-1 suppliers voiced many complaints against the
tooling provisions. A repeated complaint was that OEMs refused to allow
the use of production assets to serve multiple clients. The strict ownership
terms and the restriction against commingling and co-serving can lead to
wasteful duplicity of investments and, of course, to inefficiency. Moreover,
this strict control of the machines makes the OEMs’ potential threat to terminate a contract (and haul away the production line) more credible. The
fear that relationship-specific investments by the suppliers would be squandered increases.
***
What can we learn from these examples of fundamental variations in the
contract terms? We present this variation in the contracts as a puzzle; it contrasts with some of the conjectures we had before this study. While each
OEM has its own boilerplate, there is surprisingly little borrowing from each
other. Each OEM knows its competitors’ forms well, but rarely copies any
provision from them. In this sense, boilerplate in this industry has not risen
37
to the level of quasi-statute that it has achieved in other industries. And
while factors relating to corporate culture can explain the persistence of this
variation and the lack of convergence, it is hard to find an efficiency explanation.
Of course, contract terms do not always reflect actual practices. The actual behavior under the contract may not vary as much as the variation in

37. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (2006);
Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L.
Rev. 1105 (2006).
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38

contract language. There is some indication that OEMs may not enforce
inefficient one-sided terms. For example, in a section titled “Supplier Frequently Asked Questions” appended to its Global Terms and Conditions,
Ford explains that one of the most troubling new provisions in this form, the
39
setoff term, was never used literally and only infrequently used at all. So it
is possible that the inefficiency of some terms is only on paper and that in
practice, the OEMs apply systematic “tailored forgiveness” of some of the
40
harsher provisions. Still, it is hard to reconcile this understanding with the
angry opposition that suppliers displayed toward Ford’s recent redraft and
the collective effort that suppliers invested through their association to
change some of the terms.
Variation of terms across vendors does not itself indicate inefficiency.
There may be varying efficient ways to do business. But looking at individual terms in their context, we believe that some of the boilerplate terms are
inefficient. Warranty terms of some OEMs do not appear to solve a surplus
maximization problem but rather to place the greatest ex-post burden on the
seller. Likewise, IP terms and service parts arrangements of some OEMs do
not reflect an optimal sharing of a resource that is jointly created, but instead provide one-sided gains. Given the enormous stakes, we expected that
economic power would be used to dictate low prices, not selfish boilerplate.
But that is not what we found.
We do not claim that the boilerplate terms are the cause of the inefficiency. It is more plausible that many of these provisions, as we will argue
below, are tailored to leverage the OEMs’ economic and bargaining power
in the negotiation stage into advantages at the performance stage, in which
the parties are locked in a classic bilateral monopoly. The legal terms in the
forms are the tail that is wagged by the business dog, not vice versa. It is
clear that the American OEMs’ record-breaking losses have driven them to
capture any opportunity to shift costs to suppliers. But if indeed they do so
in a way that reduces the overall surplus of the contracts, what we are witnessing is a classic agency problem: agents find ways to save costs in the
domain that they control but often neglect to consider the effect of these
cost-saving measures on activities that they do not control. If the pressure on
suppliers is strong enough, they will accept harsh terms and low prices. And
if there are inefficient consequences, they may eventually be counted on the
scorecard of a different internal division. The lawyers and purchasing officials who write and negotiate the supply contracts invest much effort in
tightening up the legal terms and in leveraging the OEMs’ bargaining power
in securing adherence to these terms. It is possible that this exercise of their
power will degrade suppliers’ cooperation and performance in ways that
become clear only later.
38. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963).
39. Ford Motor Company Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions, Supplier
Frequently Asked Questions, § 11.02 (Jan. 2004) (on file with authors).
40.

See Johnston, supra note 23.
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II. Drafting of Boilerplate
One of the striking features of automotive supply contracts between
OEMs and their tier-1 suppliers is their simplicity. Each OEM has a single
form used for procuring all of the manufacturing parts. General Motors, we
mentioned, enters into roughly one million procurement contracts every
year with suppliers all over the world. With very little exception, these deals
are governed by GM’s “Global Terms”—terms that are never challenged,
neither at the negotiation stage (say, by battle of the forms) nor in litiga41
tion.
Another notable feature of these boilerplate forms is their durability.
DaimlerChrysler, for example, is still using the form that was drafted in
1985; GM’s form goes back to 1986. Ford’s old form had been in place
since the 1950s, until it was recently revised in quite a dramatic fashion in
2004. While minor revisions addressing new problems are patched onto
42
these forms occasionally, the main terms and conditions remain unchanged
over a long period of time. This rigidity of the forms is not so much a feature of interpretive or learning externality (that is, the adherence to
something familiar with a predictable meaning), but rather a reflection of an
OEM’s belief that the terms in its form work well and serve its profit goals.
These boilerplate contracts are simple. The terms are written in plain English. Although most of the tier-1 suppliers are large corporations with
sophisticated legal counsel who read every word of the OEM contracts, and
although each provision in these contracts can have significant effects on the
division of the surplus, the clauses are drafted in a much simpler and shorter
form than ordinary consumer contracts. For example, GM’s warranty provision is three sentences long. The main part says that “Seller warrants/
guarantees that the goods covered by this contract will conform to the specification, drawing, samples, or description furnished to or by Buyer, and will be
43
merchantable, of good material and workmanship and free of defect.” The
warranty paragraph adds that the goods “will be fit and sufficient for the
particular purposes intended by the Buyer” and that the duration of the war44
ranty will match the warranty provided by the Buyer to its customers. This
41. Only three litigated cases between OEMs and their suppliers were found. In the most
recent, GM was granted summary judgment. Nartron Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 232085, 2003
WL 1985261, at *9 (Mich. Ct. App. April 29, 2003). Another arose because of a fight over an indemnification provision; a third party was hurt while installing a piece of equipment at GM’s plant
and the equipment manufacturer tried (successfully) to get out of the indemnification provision that
was in GM’s purchase order. Hallberg v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 87 C 6478, 1989 WL 153340
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 1989). The only other case is from 1979. S.C. Gray, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 286
N.W.2d 34 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
42. An example of the type of revisions we observed is GM’s employment conditions clause
requiring the supplier to refrain from engaging in “corrupt business practices” such as using child
and prisoner labor. See General Motors General Terms and Conditions, Revised Draft § 25 (Sept.
2004) (on file with authors).
43.
thors).

See General Motors General Terms and Conditions § 9 (Sept. 2004) (on file with au-

44. Id. Ford’s Purchase Order form, stretching over thirty-one pages, is an exception to the
rule that OEM contracts are short. Ford’s form, which was launched in 2004 following a significant

BEN-SHAHAR & WHITE FINAL TYPE.DOC

966

2/16/2006 11:09 AM

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:953

paragraph is strikingly different than warranty terms in, say, consumer contracts, which are usually lengthy, cumbersome, and legalistic. Perhaps this
difference owes to the greater government regulation of consumer warranties; perhaps it has to do with the identity of the drafter—a buyer or seller. A
seller-drafter needs to avoid the sweeping warranties of the UCC, whereas
buyers like the OEMs need only to strengthen the pro-buyer UCC warranties. Note, also, that the difference between warranty terms in the auto
production context and other, consumer-related contracts cannot be explained by factors like trade usage and course of dealing. The supplier’s
warranty to the OEM is governed solely by the express warranty term.
Since boilerplate terms have to deal with many different types of situations and address many possible contingencies, drafting the standard form
from scratch would seem a daunting task. It is often perceived, therefore,
that the drafting of boilerplate language in mass contracts involves not much
more than a cut-and-paste task, whereby the drafter identifies similar forms
used by other organizations that do similar business and—on the premise
that “if they work for others they’ll also work for me”—borrows their lan45
guage. Interestingly, the American OEM supply contracts were not drafted
in this fashion. Each OEM contract was drafted by in-house attorneys in a
concentrated effort over a short period of time with very little revision
46
since. These attorneys are familiar with the forms used by their competitors but seldom copy or borrow language from these sources. Unlike the
drafting work done by outside law firms, the in-house drafting attorneys
have a task that is ongoing. While revisions in the forms are rare, the drafting attorneys remain with the organization for a long period of time,
carrying with them the institutional memory concerning the drafter’s intent
and the rationales for the chosen language. Memory, of course, is a necessary trait for parties who enter long-term relationships or into portfolios of
deals, in which violations are addressed (and deterred) by informal sanctions within the relationship or by refusals to deal.
Given the simplicity of the forms and the ambitious goal to apply them
to each and every manufacturing parts contract, how do OEMs overcome the
different needs and objections of their tier-1 suppliers? Part of the answer, of
course, concerns the performance and enforcement strategies, which we will
discuss later. There, we will show, some patterns of flexibility have
emerged. In the contract formation stage, however, we observe very little
flexibility. Either take our contract as it is, or leave. This rigidity is maintained in several ways, as explained below.
overhaul, does contain simple language, but it covers many more contingencies than other OEM
contracts. Still, Ford’s warranty term is almost identical to GM’s, and equally short.
45. There are many theoretical accounts of this “stickiness” of boilerplate. See, e.g., Robert
B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of the International
Order, 53 Emory L.J. 691, 713–21 (2004); Omri Ben-Shahar & John Pottow, On the Stickiness of
Contractual Default Rules, Fl. St. U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2006); Choi & Gulati, supra note 37, at
1157–59; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 16, at 761–64.
46. But see Klaus-Dieter Floerecke, German Suppliers Revolt Against Ford Motor: Vendors
Demand Contract Revisions, Auto. News, Apr. 19, 2004, at 10.
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No Battles of the Forms. Battles of the forms, in which the seller responds to the OEM’s purchase order with a confirmation that contains
different boilerplate terms, have the standard result that conflicting terms on
both sides drop out. The battle of the forms might, of course, enable a supplier to substitute its own terms for some of the OEM’s more onerous terms.
One might predict that the battle of the forms would be common in automotive contracting.
As far as we were able to determine, there is no battle-of-the-forms ma47
neuvering against OEMs. We could not find reference to a single legal
dispute on battle of the forms with an OEM, and none of the OEM or tier-1
representatives were able to quote an example. Battles-of-the-forms disputes
are not avoided by forcing the supplier to acquiesce ex post to the OEM’s
terms. Rather, they are prevented ex ante by the OEM’s insisting at the time
that it invites bids that, as a condition for bidding, the supplier must agree to
be bound by the boilerplate terms of the OEM’s form. Since the bidding
occurs before the contract has been issued and at the time when the supplier’s position is the weakest—at the time when its refusal to commit to the
OEM’s boilerplate could cost it the opportunity to bid—it is not surprising
that most tier-1 suppliers agree not to engage in the battle of the forms and
instead sign or otherwise agree to a form that binds them to the OEM
48
terms.
Suppliers who do attempt to sneak in their boilerplate terms—either on
the invoices or acknowledgments, or through what they sometimes call “letters of interpretation” or “side-memos”—are generally doomed to fail. OEM
attorneys instruct their purchasing managers to abort any incipient attempt
to engage in the battle of the forms by affirmatively rejecting any of the sellers’ forms or by getting the seller’s signature on the buyer’s form. The same
is true for other sophisticated, high-tier buyers when dealing with the forms
49
of their own downstream suppliers.
No Authority to Dicker. Another way in which OEMs prevent deviations
from their own terms is by restricting the authority of agents within the organization to approve different or additional terms. Suppliers in the chain
periodically try to negotiate or change the terms of the boilerplate imposed

47. We suspect but could not confirm that the battle of the forms may occur as one goes
deeper into the supply chain down to tier-3 and tier-4 suppliers.
48. For example, suppliers who objected to Ford’s new Global Terms and Conditions “were
threatened with new business hold and award of pending business to competitors.” See Urgent
Ford Global Terms and Conditions: Status Report Web Conference, OESA (Apr. 2, 2004).
That survey shows that thirty-one out of forty-six Ford suppliers were warned that they would experience business reduction if they refused to accept Ford’s terms.
49. The finding that battles of the forms almost never occur is based on many conversations
with attorneys in the industry. It may well be, though, that the picture portrayed by attorneys is not
precise. Purchasing agents and engineering officers may have a particular interest in the deal—say
because of the attractive price or the unique technology offered by the supplier—which would lead
them to care little whether some “legal” terms are contested in a boilerplate letter sent by the supplier. The attorneys’ score card, on the other hand, depends on their success in blocking ex post
disputes and securing the most favorable boilerplate terms. It is perhaps this desire to boast and to
display a successful legal record that distorts the picture we report.
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by the OEMs or other buyers. Both OEM and supplier representatives agree
that changes in the boilerplate resulting from negotiations with an individual
seller are as rare as hens’ teeth. Ford, for example, has erected a clever and
conscious barrier to such negotiation: only the global vice president for purchasing has the authority to change the terms on the form contract.
Similarly, in another OEM we observed a procedure in which only a senior
purchasing committee of executives can approve a variation from the standard terms. By taking the authority away from the lower-level purchasing
agents and their executives and granting it only to a person who presumably
does not answer every phone call, these companies have raised a significant
barrier to negotiation. Thus, no revision of a term can occur unless the person proposing it can talk to someone in authority or can persuade a lower
level person to do so. And what first-level purchasing manager wishes to
besmirch his in-firm reputation as a tough negotiator and impair his chances
for advancement by proposing to the big boss that the company make concessions to a tier-1 supplier? In fact, this barrier is recognized by suppliers
as credible and intimidating, discouraging them from demanding that some
terms be negotiated.
Furthermore, any variation in the legal terms would need to be drafted
by a staff attorney. The legal offices of the OEMs simply do not have the
resources to oversee frequent changes in the thousands of contracts entered
into daily. This lack of legal capacity is another internal organizational hurdle, known to suppliers and deemed credible by them, that blocks any
process of dickering over the legal terms.
Equality of Treatment. Another factor that limits the incidence of variation from the boilerplate terms is the strong formal commitment of OEMs to
treat all their suppliers equally. Of course, transactions with suppliers vary
significantly with respect to the goods purchased, prices, volume, and the
like. But all suppliers—from the mega corporations who produce car frames
to the sellers of nuts and bolts—must take the same legal terms: payment
provisions, termination rights, warranties and remedies, and so forth. OEMs
believe that the fact that these terms are presented as nonnegotiable and that
variations are not approved provides their suppliers with assurance that there
is horizontal equity, that everyone is treated the same. In fact, this equity
factor is a reason why one of the OEMs recently revised its entire set of boilerplate provisions. It clarified to its suppliers that any concession negotiated
by them in previous contracts would, of course, be honored for the duration
of that contract (usually one year), but thereafter all terms would revert to
the new set of “Global Terms and Conditions,” and the old concessions
50
would expire unless affirmatively approved by the vice president. OEMs
believe that suppliers recognize that more is at stake for the OEM than the
individual concession. Their implicit position—“if we give one of you an
accommodation, we’ll have to give it to others”—works strategically to

50. Ford Motor Co. Production Purchasing Global Terms and Conditions § 4.09 (Jan. 2004)
(on file with authors).
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block any accommodations in the same way that most-favored-nation
51
clauses bolster the commitment to avoid price discounts.
Open-Ended Provisions. The automotive industry is the typical example
of a market in which contractual arrangements are long term. This is particularly true of OEM–tier-1 relationships, in which there are specific
agreements to procure parts as long as the car model is produced, normally
four to eight years. But relationships also extend beyond a single model to
encompass many such car-model contracts and to cover the many years of
supply of service parts. Given the difficulty of anticipating many factors that
may become relevant in the course of performing the agreements, it is
commonly noted that contracts signed up front must exhibit flexibility and
must leave room for governance by ad hoc adjustments, agreements to
agree, and informal norms. Indeed, the OEM boilerplate forms, although
“tight” in many respects, contain many open-ended provisions that allow the
parties to determine, in due time and if the contingency arises, matters of
significant value. These open-ended clauses include price adjustments for
changes in design; allocation of liability regarding the cost of recalls and
other failures of components; indemnification of litigation costs in defending against injury claims by car owners and infringement of intellectual
property claims; and more. These clauses leave it to the parties to “attempt
in good faith to reach agreement” or to “negotiate diligently” the precise expost term. In this way, up-front dickering is avoided, and suppliers are willing to accept the contract although none of their needs are directly
addressed.
Interestingly, OEMs use such open-ended provisions to address some of
the issues that would otherwise be most troubling for suppliers. When Ford
recently redrafted its entire form, suppliers were invited to voice their concerns and reactions to the proposed draft. While these meetings were not an
open invitation to negotiate the new terms, they did represent the closest
thing to negotiations over boilerplate, whereby uniform objections by suppliers did lead to some—albeit minor—changes in the draft. Specifically,
suppliers were disgruntled over terms that allowed OEMs to impose costly
changes in design, terms that permit OEMs to setoff any cost incurred in
servicing a recall or a warranty against the account of the supplier of the
allegedly defective part, and terms that allocate a fixed share of the liability
to the suppliers. Not surprisingly, it is with respect to these issues that the
OEM elected to implement open-ended terms, postponing the dickering of
the actual resolution of individual cases, if the issues arise, to the postperformance stage.
The Dissemination of Boilerplate Terms across Tiers. OEM contracts
with their tier-1 suppliers affect the contracts entered into in lower tiers.
Tier-1 suppliers, being strapped to the onerous OEM terms, turn around and
offer the same terms to their own tier-2 suppliers. Of course, they may have
less bargaining power to mandate their own terms, but at least the very large
tier-1 companies—the twenty-five or so mega-corporations like Delphi and
51.

Avinash K. Dixit & Barry J. Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically 147–48 (1991).
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Visteon that supply a large portfolio of parts—ordinarily have enough leverage to require suppliers to use their terms. Representatives of tier-1 suppliers
admitted to us that they would have much preferred to use a more balanced
contract both upstream and downstream, which again suggests that the
OEMs terms are inefficient—the tier-1 companies are shielded from the
terms’ distributive effect, and can be averse to them only because of the
waste that they create. But given the OEM terms that are imposed on them
in their capacity as sellers, they cannot afford to use other terms in their capacity as buyers. A striking metaphor that a tier-1 representative used is
“contractual DNA.” Looking at contracts down the supply chain, one can
identify the OEM for which a given supply is eventually intended by the
terms of the lower-tier contracts. With each tier buyer copying some of the
terms it had to accept as a supplier, the OEM’s terms are “genetically” replicated down the chain.
The special position of tier-1 suppliers explains their ambivalence toward the otherwise concerted effort of suppliers in the automotive industry
to advocate for “fairer” contracts. Some of this effort is coordinated by the
suppliers’ trade association, the Original Equipment Suppliers Association
(“OESA”). One of OESA’s projects was the drafting of the Model General
Terms and Conditions, which is a self-proclaimed “more balanced approach
to buyer-seller relations” with the goal of “increas[ing] cooperation, com52
munication, and trust between buyers and sellers.” Tier-1 representatives
have generally been less than enthusiastic, however, in supporting this initiative. Their concern is that if such an initiative would succeed and the use of
the model terms would become a standard request of suppliers, it would
harm their position vis-à-vis their lower-tier suppliers, without helping them
much vis-à-vis the OEMs. If a tier-1 supplier has to sign a fixed-price contract with an OEM for five years, it needs a contract with a tier-2 supplier
that extends for the same period of time to enable it to maintain the fixed
53
price.
III. Economic Power
Although courts and lawyers sometimes talk about form contracts as
nonnegotiable and subject to no limits, we know that is not true. Some
drafters pull back from the limit of their economic power, some decline to
exercise the rights that their contracts give, some contracts are invalidated
52. Original Equip. Suppliers Ass’n, OESA Publications: Model Terms and Conditions 3 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.oesa.org/publications/index.php (last visited Jan. 10,
2006).
53. In Germany, an organization called the Verband der Automobilindustrie negotiates with
the OEMs on behalf of the suppliers. See supra note 30. The OEM forms used in Germany are the
product of this collective bargaining. If initiatives in the United States like OESA’s are to succeed
the way they succeed in Germany, they have to start with the OEMs; the terms will then trickle
down the supply tiers. Because the OEMs do not appear willing to enter into such a bargain and
because the tier-1 suppliers cannot afford to enter into a bargain without the OEMs entering into one
first, we do not foresee a collective agreement in the United States among the suppliers and the
OEMs of the kind that apparently exists in Germany.
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by courts, and others are constrained by legislation, regulation, or by threat
of litigation or legislation. In this part, we examine how market power
shapes the deals and the contracts, with an eye to the specific provisions in
the OEMs’ purchase orders that are aimed at securing their economic power.
At the outset of this study, we hypothesized that OEMs’ bargaining
power would be strongest at the bidding and contract formation stage and
weakest once relationship-specific investments were made and performance
began. We imagined that once the OEMs became dependent on a supplier,
they would face instances of hold up, in which the supplier demanded better
price and other terms. The standard hold-up account seems to fit this situation perfectly—in fact, the hold-up theory was developed in the context of
the GM–Fisher Body saga, which was an OEM–tier-1 relation. This hypothesis turned out to be surprisingly misguided, as we will explain below.
We also hypothesized that economic power would echo down the supply
tiers, with tier-1 suppliers being dominated by OEMs but exercising their
own dominance over tier-2 suppliers. This too turned out to be only partially
true. Some powerful companies, such as Exxon and General Electric, are in
the tier-2 levels and are able to wield power because of their size and product mix. Other tier-2 suppliers have power because of their wide base of
clients, extending beyond the automotive industry, and can afford to pass on
automotive contracts. Yet other low-tier suppliers have power that is supported by the uniqueness of their technology. Finally, the financial integrity
of a firm turned out to affect its economic power in ways that are more subtle than we expected.
As we mentioned above, the OEM representatives freely admitted that
their forms included most terms that the drafters thought necessary or helpful to protect their clients’ interests, and that they did not feel obliged to add
similar terms that their sellers might have liked. For example, all of the
OEM contracts (and presumably most between suppliers) give the buyer the
right to terminate the contract without cause in certain circumstances and to
cancel it for cause in other cases. The sellers get no corresponding rights of
termination or cancellation. This power, along with the absence of a quantity
commitment on the part of the OEM, makes the contract so one-sided that it
54
runs the risk of being unenforceable. European suppliers have complained
that such one-sided terms would be unenforceable under various European
doctrines of contractual fairness, competition law (for instance, the term
prohibiting suppliers from selling parts in the aftermarket), and corporate
governance (the supplier’s corporate executive may not have the internal
55
authority to sign such a poor contract without shareholder authorization).
How far can OEMs go in drafting one-sided terms? Surely, if suppliers
have choices, they can bargain away these clauses. But for automotive suppliers who sell a large chunk of their output to OEMs, in a market in which
54. We are aware of only one case in which a supplier rejected the contract and argued lack
of mutuality. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Steel Dynamics, No. CR-04-056983-CK (Cir. Ct. Oakland
County, Mich. 2004).
55.

Bradford Wernle, Ford Vendors Balk at Tough Contract, Auto. News, July 5, 2004, at 8.
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suppliers suffer severe overcapacity, there does not appear to be much
choice. A CEO of one of Ford’s suppliers was quoted in the Automotive
News to say that Ford’s terms are effective in “closing every possible loop56
hole. We’re responsible for acts of God now.” At the same time, the
collective disgruntlement that echoed in the suppliers’ corps did not change
any of the terms. Another supplier admitted that “[i]f you don’t have a point
57
of leverage, you don’t have much ability to fight back.” Other attempts,
made under the umbrella of the suppliers’ trade association, OESA, to col58
lectively draft a form more favorable to sellers have not, as far as we can
tell, influenced even a single term of the OEMs’ contract forms.
A. Lower-Tier Contracts
When we move down from OEM contracts to lower tiers in the supply
chain, bargaining power is no longer one-sided. Tier-1 suppliers cannot exert
the same influence on tier-2s as OEMs exerted against them. For one, tier-1
suppliers do not offer the same magnitude and rarity of deals as OEMs do. If
an OEM turns down a bid by a manufacturer of passenger seats, a big chunk
of the business cannot be salvaged. On the other hand, if the same manufacturer of seats breaks the negotiations with the supplier of leather, that
supplier would have many other business opportunities. Moreover, under
contracts with OEMs, tier-1 suppliers occasionally are bound to use specific
tier-2 suppliers. Similarly, once awarded a big contract by the OEMs, tier-1s
have less flexibility to turn down suppliers. Time is of the essence and the
tier-1 supplier must secure its own sources of supply, exposing it to potential
hold up by a tier-2 supplier who is particularly well positioned to supply the
goods in time.
Still, we find that tier-1 suppliers have some success overcoming these
weaknesses and imposing their own terms on their suppliers. Some tier-1
self-drafted contracts include terms that their own attorneys admit are more
onerous than the OEM terms. For example, the tier-1 contract we saw provided that the tier-2 supplier must indemnify the buyer for one hundred
percent of the liability that the buyer bears vis-à-vis the OEM. That is, while
OEM contracts either leave the issue of the division of liability for costly
recalls and other defects open or impose a fifty-percent-unless-otherwiseagreed-upon split, the tier-1 contract imposed one hundred percent of the
59
liability on the supplier. The reason, it was explained to us, is that OEMs
have the ex-post power, once a recall occurs, to dictate the supplier’s share,
and there is not much a disgruntled supplier can do other than plead for a
fair allocation. On the other hand, tier-2 suppliers can fight back and in
some events litigate or seek arbitration to settle these issues. Thus, to
56. Amy Wilson & Bradford Wernle, Ford Gives Suppliers Tough Terms, Auto. News, Feb.
16, 2004, at 1 (quoting the CEO of a Ford supplier).
57.

Id. (quoting a supplier executive).

58.

OESA Analysis, supra note 11.

59.

See Delphi Corp. General Terms and Conditions, supra note 25.
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counter the greater ex-post power of tier-2s, that contract was written with a
more onerous term.
Moreover, when terms are disputed by their suppliers at the negotiation
stage, tier-1 companies resort to what can be labeled a “golden rule.” Since
pro-buyer boilerplate terms were imposed on the tier-1 by the OEMs when
the tier-1s played the role of a seller, it is only fair that the tier-1 company
would use symmetric terms in their roles as buyers. The argument made by
tier-1s, that they cannot afford to give their sellers better terms because they
cannot turn around and negotiate similar concessions as sellers to the
OEMs, is often successful. It is this mechanism that causes the OEM terms
to be replicated downstream.
B. Sellers’ Power Due to Switching Costs
An important factor that appeared to influence the contracts among the
OEMs and suppliers was the OEMs’ significant switching costs. All of the
OEM representatives, while recognizing that they have much of the bargaining power at the bidding stage, acknowledged that the pendulum shifts and
suppliers may have some power in the course of carrying out a long-term
contract. Many current contracts are for intricate subassemblies that will be
installed wholesale into a finished automobile. For example, an OEM might
buy the entire heating and cooling system from a supplier, and the supplier
might be the principal designer of the system. Since any such system must
integrate with the car’s electrical and other systems and must conform to the
physical location that is set aside for it in the completed automobile, the
“part” may be unique. It is this uniqueness that accords the supplier the
power.
Put differently, there are high switching costs in auto manufacturing.
Switching costs are high because of the significant technological investments that other suppliers would have to expend to be able to fill the
required order. For example, a tier-1 supplier may make all of the frames of
a high-volume vehicle. That supplier built an assembly line to manufacture
the frames and had considerable difficulty meeting the OEM’s technological
requirements. These same complexities of building and operating an entire
assembly line would confront any new supplier if the OEM fired its current
60
supplier. Such difficulties cannot be overcome in a short period of time.
Switching costs are also high because of safety problems. If the supplier’s work relates to the brakes, engine operation, passenger restraints or
the car’s suspension, defects may pose safety risks and may be an integral
part of the OEM’s satisfaction of governmental safety regulations. If the
replacement of one supplier’s part with another’s would require additional
safety tests to comply with governmental regulations, one can be sure that
any change of suppliers would be costly and time consuming. Moreover,
60. But see Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Rethinking Relationship-Specific Investments: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2636 (2000)
(providing an account of the Japanese auto industry and suggesting that relationship-specific investments and switching costs play less of a role than is usually assumed).
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even without having to comply with safety regulations, switching costs may
be high because of the need to integrate the component with other parts and
to test its performance before assembling it into the vehicle. It is for these
reasons that an OEM usually relies upon the “sole-source” supply method,
under which it purchases its requirements of parts or raw materials from one
supplier. Using more than one supplier—either by switching over time or
contemporaneously—would significantly increase the testing and tooling
costs, lead to inconsistent quality, and undermine economies of scale.
If an OEM who abandons a supplier would suffer prohibitive costs in
finding and qualifying a replacement, it may be conjectured that the original
supplier has some economic power over the OEM for the contracted goods
or services for some period—perhaps even to the end of the model run of
the vehicle in which the part or assembly is installed. This power, we should
expect, would be at its height shortly after production commences when the
supplier looks forward to five years of work and the competing bidders have
turned to other things. In fact, this conjecture—that a tier-1 supplier can
exert hold-up power against an OEM after production begins—is widely
recognized as the benchmark example in economic theory for the general
problem of contractual hold up. The standard account of the hold-up problem was developed and generically illustrated in the context of the very
same OEM–tier-1 contracts that we explored. It suggests that in the 1920s,
Fisher Body (a tier-1 supplier of automotive bodies) had a ten-year requirements contract with General Motors. When GM’s requirements increased
due to the greater demand for closed-body cars, Fisher Body enjoyed an
“intolerable” position to hold up General Motors and to refuse to make adjustments that were overall efficient, and was therefore acquired and
61
vertically integrated into GM. It is not clear how much evidence substanti62
ates the GM–Fisher Body hold-up story, and yet it seems plausible that in
light of the high switching costs, OEMs would indeed be vulnerable to rentextraction. As one leading economist explains:
Why did GM and Fisher Body not simply write a better contract? Arguably, GM recognized that, however good a contract it wrote with Fisher
Body, [. . .] contingencies might occur that no contract could allow for.
GM wanted to be sure that next time around it would be in a stronger bar-

61. See Klein et al., supra note 1; Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration as Organizational
Ownership: The Fisher Body–General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. Econ. & Org. 199
(1988). The Klein account of the Fisher Body–GM merger and its illustrative role for the theory of
the firm has been widely embraced. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff,
Modern Industrial Organization 13 (2d ed. 1994).
62. In recent studies, Ronald Coase and others have argued that GM’s takeover of Fisher
Body did not intend to solve contractual hold up by Fisher Body—in fact, no such hold up ever
occurred—but rather to secure GM’s stronghold over a critical supplier vis-à-vis other OEMs. See
R.H. Coase, The Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & Econ. 15 (2000); Douglas G. Baird, In Coase’s Footsteps, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 23 (2003); Ramon Casadesus-Masanell &
Daniel F. Spulber, The Fable of Fisher Body, 43 J.L. & Econ. 67 (2000); Robert Freeland, Creating
Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited, 43 J.L. & Econ. 33 (2000).

BEN-SHAHAR & WHITE FINAL TYPE.DOC

March 2006]

2/16/2006 11:09 AM

Auto Manufacturing Contracts

975

gaining position; in particular, it would be able to insist on extra supplies,
63
without having to pay a great deal for them.

Our own findings suggest that, at least in the automotive business, this
bargaining position–hold-up account is misguided. For one, the contracts are
pretty good at dealing with this problem, as we will show below. But even
without looking into the contractual language, this account ignores the fact
that each individual transaction is only part of a larger portfolio of business,
both concurrently and into the future. Even for unique goods, the power of
the supplier to hold up its buyer is effectively limited. If the seller uses its
power to engage in explicit hold up (for instance, “Give me an increase in
price or I won’t ship”) it knows it will lose in the long run. One OEM representative emphasized that the buyers “have long memories” and assured us
that a successful threat by a seller would surely count against it in the award
of new contracts. Even more threatening, the representative told us, is that a
major disruption at one OEM is likely to become known to the others and to
be considered by other OEMs when bids are being evaluated. Representatives of suppliers concurred with this skeptical view. If a supplier puts a gun
to the head of the OEM, it would be “suicide,” they claim; the short-term
benefit from extracting some concession will be more than offset by the
long-term reputation sanction.
The myth that suppliers can engage in hold up overlooks a very basic
fact. Suppliers trying to hold up OEMs must threaten to halt production of a
part that is necessary to keep the assembly line working. Such a threat, if
carried out, would lead to enormous losses, constituting an entire meltdown
in the industry. The tier-1 supplier who commits such a hold up would therefore be subjected to potentially bankrupting damages, some of which can be
setoff by the OEM against the supplier’s account as a matter of self-help.
64
Moreover, the OEM would likely be able to get injunctive relief, thus barring such a threat from being carried out in the first place. In other words,
the hold-up account assumes lethargic contractual obligation and legal enforcement, which is probably far from reality.
Moreover, in his rebuttal of the Fisher Body myth, Ronald Coase speculated that problems of supplier hold up can be addressed by OEMs
65
contractually. We have seen some evidence for such contractual arrangements. First, OEMs have almost unconstrained authority to terminate
contracts. That is, if anyone has the contractual power to threaten to walk
away, it is the OEM, not the supplier. True, they may not want to terminate a
contract for supply of unique parts, but they can threaten to terminate other
contracts with this same supplier, to phase out its business. Second, OEMs
maintain significant property rights in “tooling,” namely in the machines
and production assets at the suppliers’ plants, and they can haul these assets
away once the contract is terminated, often with only stingy compensation
63.

Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure 7 (1995).

64.

Johnson Controls v. A.P.T. Critical Sys., 323 F. Supp. 2d 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

65.

See Coase supra note 62.
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66

for suppliers’ sunk investment. Thus, a supplier is in effect posting a bond
against hold up; its investment will be amortized in the course of produc67
tion, but only if it sticks around for the long haul. Third, OEMs reserve for
themselves, in other boilerplate terms, the right to control the very profitable
market for service parts for years, sometimes decades, into the future, and to
potentially share this profit with suppliers. Suppliers that hold up the OEM
in the short run will lose in a big way in the division of the aftermarket surplus. Finally, buyers in this industry do enjoy some success in securing court
68
injunctions against breach and can thus fend off suppliers who are holding
up in order to renegotiate existing terms.
In his rebuttal of the GM–Fisher Body myth, Coase then is correct in as69
serting that contractual provisions can protect OEMs from hold up. But a
more important aspect, we believe, and one that is also recognized by
Coase, is that the “concern for their reputation would also have deterred the
70
Fisher brothers from engaging in [hold up].” The explanations we heard
from all the participants confirmed that it is indeed the OEMs’ long memories and the sanctions they can levy upon bad suppliers in future deals—that
is, reputation sanctions—that render hold up a bad strategy for tier-1 suppliers. Any short-term gain to be had by this offensive bargaining tactic will be
greatly offset by long-term losses in future deals. The hold-up myth fails
because it is based on a false empirical assumption that suppliers specialize
in a single part or assembly. In reality, many of the suppliers—and the large
ones in particular—supply hundreds of parts and assemblies to the OEMs.
Their business is not to supply a part, but a portfolio of parts. Even if they
have some power with respect to one part, it does not change the fact that as
suppliers of portfolios whose only clients are the few OEMs, they are captives, rather than hijackers. That is, the business plan of these supply
firms—large diversified companies that specialize in automotive parts—is to
build a symbiotic relationship with their clients, a fabric of reliability that
will be completely undermined by hold up.
Thus, if long-term contracts confer power on the weaker seller but the
seller cannot engage in hold up, how is that power used? First the power
ameliorates the standard contract termination or cancellation terms. If the
66. See Miwa and Ramseyer, supra note 60, at 2642; Baird, supra note 62, at 26 (noting that
the GM–Fisher hold-up account is not plausible because GM could have retained ownership of dies,
which it would be able to retrieve in case Fisher engaged in hold up).
67. This ownership-of-tooling mechanism may appear to conform in part to the KleinCrawford-Alchian hypothesis, that the problem of hold up is addressed through vertical integration.
See supra note 1. What we found in the contracts is indeed an ownership solution, but not one that
rises to complete integration. Instead, OEMs have devised a subtle scheme in which they maintain
partial ownership rights in the supplier’s tooling, rights that gradually diminish over the life of the
contract as the hold-up scare diminishes. The rights do not give them actual control of the organization of production but may allow them to exclude commingling and other uses, thereby reducing the
alternative value of the assets to the supplier.
68. See, e.g., Delphi Auto. Sys. v. Eaton Corp., No. 05-55257-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct. Saginaw
County Jan. 31, 2005) (order granting preliminary injunction).
69.

Coase, supra note 62, at 30.

70.

Id.
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buyer cannot find a replacement, it cannot exercise its legal right to cancel.
Second, particularly with a weak supplier, the contract may mitigate an
OEM’s setoff or hold-back of funds earned when the OEM claims that the
supplier broke the contract. If the supplier is in a weak financial state, the
OEM risks losing the supplier’s production if it reduces the supplier’s cash
flow by setoff. We suspect that the seller’s power is also expressed in more
subtle effects on the buyer’s use of its boilerplate. For example. we can
imagine buyers hesitating to be as aggressive as they might be in using the
boilerplate indemnity provision against an important seller. As we suggest
above, a seller needs to be felicitous in its use of this power (for instance,
“Can you give me some help with my increased material costs?”) to escape
identification as a chiseler who should be avoided when new contracts are
awarded. Further, since many tier-1 suppliers produce a portfolio of parts,
they can leverage the power they have in the supply of one crucial component to secure additional deals for other parts.
C. Bankruptcy
The picture of a weak tier-1 supplier, squeezed by powerful OEMs that
demand ever growing discounts, can change dramatically when the supplier
experiences insolvency. When this happens, suppliers’ threats to stop performing critical contracts become credible. They are credible because they
come not from a company that is concerned with long-term business, but
from stern bankruptcy workout specialists who have no attachment to next
year’s business or even to next month’s if current crises can be sur71
mounted. In the automotive industry of today, in which suppliers’
72
bankruptcy has become a real danger and their threat to file in Chapter 11
more credible, many suppliers who are known to be suffering losses have a
73
more powerful negotiation position vis-à-vis their buyers.
Ironically, at times when the supplier’s costs increase unexpectedly, it is
that very weakness of the supplier’s economic power and its inability to secure modifications to the contracts with the OEMs that can send it to
bankruptcy and eventually bolster the credibility of its threat. Threats from the
weak and desperate are more powerful than threats from the strong and rational. Indeed, the increasing hardship of the American automotive industry
71. For a general discussion of why a threat to breach becomes credible in bankruptcy, see
Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 717 (2005). See also Jeffrey
McCracken, Plan OK’d for Aid to Keep C & A Supplying, Detroit Free Press, July 8, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 10705184.
72. During the time we conducted this study, five major automobile suppliers filed in Chapter 11: Delphi (the world’s largest tier-1 supplier), Tower Automotive (a builder of frames for the
Ford Explorer), Intermet (a steel supplier), Meridian (a steering parts producer), and Collins and
Aikman (a maker of plastic trim, interior fabric and plastic parts such as dash board consoles and
head liners). See Robert Sherefkin, Suppliers’ Woes Put Bond Ratings on the Junk Heap, Auto.
News, Aug. 8, 2005, at 1.
73. For example, prior to filing for bankruptcy, tier-1 supplier Delphi issued a threat to General Motors and to the UAW, demanding renegotiation of many prior agreements. See Brett Clanton,
Delphi’s Troubles May Cost GM, Detroit News, Aug. 31, 2005, at 1.
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provides ample examples of this unfortunate dynamic. These examples
confirm that tier-1 suppliers have no power to hold up the OEMs when the
OEMs know that their suppliers regard the costs of long-term retribution as
greater than the near term gains from improved terms. But when retribution
loses its effect, hold up can be significant. Still, suppliers generally believe
that even if it is bankruptcy that drives the price renegotiation, the victorious
supplier will suffer significant detriments in future dealings.
IV. The Exceptions: Deviations from the Boilerplate
A. Information Technology Transactions
In this sea of refusal to budge, which we describe above, we did find one
area in which the OEMs often negotiate boilerplate terms and agree to deviate from the global terms. All of the OEMs reported that their relationships
with information technology providers were different from their relationships with conventional suppliers. IT suppliers sometimes successfully force
the OEMs to sign on to their own forms; other times they successfully negotiate revisions of the standard global terms in areas of great importance. In
fact, some OEMs have drafted different forms for IT suppliers. Ordinarily,
IT suppliers insist on terms that grant them greater ownership in the intellectual property. They also successfully limit their liability and cap it at a level
far below the liability that conventional suppliers may face, usually not to
exceed the price paid for the component. Finally, they are reluctant to provide the same types of extensive warranties that OEMs usually demand.
Why do IT suppliers succeed in extracting more favorable boilerplate?
We heard explanations focusing on the concentration and leverage of the IT
suppliers, led by Microsoft and other superpowers. This is probably true in
the automotive context, where the IT firms are more diverse suppliers, less
dependent on their OEM buyers. But this explanation does not account for
the fact that even less powerful IT suppliers enjoy the more favorable terms.
Another conjecture is that for IT companies, the intellectual property
clauses in the contracts are critical, as this is their only asset. Standing to
lose more from the OEMs’ IP provisions, their resistance to these expropriatory clauses is therefore more credible.
And yet IT firms succeed not only in securing better intellectual property terms but also far more lenient warranty and remedies provisions. We
74. One prominent example is Collins and Aikman (“C&A”), a tier-1 supplier who entered
bankruptcy in May 2005. This company, which makes parts used in 90% of American cars, many of
which are irreplaceable complex assemblies manufactured in factories that are symbiotically attached to OEMs’ plants, was unable to leverage the uniqueness of its products into profitable
contracts. The more it grew, the more dependent it became on future contracts from the OEMs and the
weaker was its economic power in the bargaining game. When C&A filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, it threatened to stop performance unless its contracts were renegotiated and the prices
increased—that is, it engaged in classic hold up. Given its well-known cash shortage and the demands
of unsecured creditors to stop performance of losing contracts, C&A had a credible threat. The
payoff from the use of this power was quick: the three OEMs agreed to give C&A $82.5 million by
raising the prices on their existing supply contracts with C&A by 15%, to purchase $140 million of
tooling, and to make a loan of $82.5 million. See McCracken, supra note 71.
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found this feature to be the most puzzling. Could it be explained by the fact
that, unlike the ordinary tier-1 assemblers, IT firms do not buy parts and
therefore do not have many tier-2s to which they can turn around and dump
similar anti-seller terms?
The prevalence of warranty and remedy limitations in the IT area can perhaps be explained by the nature of information products. It is often difficult to
determine whether a defect in the operation of the integrated component is a
result of bugs in the software or inadequate specification requested by the
client. When a machine shuts down due to software problems, the consequential harm may be huge, and yet the fix may be simple and cheap.
Moreover, IT firms provide their services to a variety of industries and
products. Similar technologies and information can be adapted to heterogeneous products and applications. Thus, it is beyond the expertise of the IT
supplier to foresee the types and magnitude of the consequential harm that a
defect might cause, and it is therefore hard to insure. Self-insurance by the
more specialized buyer makes economic sense. As a result, suppliers of IT
are unwilling to provide warranties beyond repair and replacement.
B. Japanese Manufacturers.
Outside the area of IT contracts, we discovered that at least some of the
Asian OEMs will modify some parts of their boilerplate terms. One tier-1
supplier reported that a Japanese OEM would listen to focused and wellreasoned objections to particular provisions of its form contract. The tier-1
supplier emphasized that even the Japanese OEM would not agree to wholesale changes to its form, but he made clear that the Japanese attitude toward
negotiation was markedly different from that of American OEMs. Another
source confirmed that while Toyota and Honda have contracts with strict
terms, they view their relationship with suppliers as long term and place
more value on suppliers’ satisfaction.
So why are the Japanese OEMs more generous than the American OEMs
75
to their suppliers? Doubtless part of the reason is cultural, having to do with
76
norms of negotiation and the like. Also, it is sometimes speculated that Japanese manufacturers may be sensitive to the hostile publicity that they might
earn if they contribute to the demise of a large American manufacturer of

75. See generally John L. Graham, The Japanese Negotiation Style: Characteristics of a
Distinct Approach, 9 Negotiation J. 123 (1993).
76. The following anecdote illustrates the type of behavior that we denote “cultural.” One of
our respondents in an American tier-2 company explained how a tier-1 Japanese supplier agreed to
give a price increase. The American supplier had agreed to make and sell a part to the tier-1 supplier
for approximately $3.00. When the first parts were delivered they were missing one weld. The weld
had been identified on the drawings in Japanese, and the seller had failed to translate that part of the
instructions. When the parties discovered this, the Japanese buyer agreed to add 7¢ to the price to
cover the cost of the additional weld—with the admonition that the seller had better get it right the
next time. The seller’s representative assured us that any American OEM would have “pointed to the
contract” and forced the seller to eat the cost.
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supply parts. But we believe that an important reason is the economic distress of the American OEMs. Several representatives traced the current state
of “war” between OEMs and suppliers to a managerial change that occurred
in General Motors in the 1980s. Earlier, American OEMs in general, and
GM in particular, were more generous with suppliers in all phases of their
relations. But the mounting losses of the auto manufacturers could find an
outlet in only a few places. Even though improvident contracts for pay, pensions, and health benefits with the UAW may be the principal cause of the
current economic distress, no OEM has the power to open a labor contract
and get large concessions from the union. That meant OEMs turned to easier
prey: their suppliers.
Most of the Japanese manufacturers (Nissan and Mitsubishi may be exceptions) have not suffered the same distress. Both Toyota and Honda have
78
been consistently profitable for many reasons, for instance good management, the absence of union contracts with their American workers, the
comparative youth of their American workers, and the Japanese state’s assumption of some of the liabilities in Japan that private companies must bear
in the United States. Both the earlier American experience and reason suggest that insistence on one’s own tough terms with no exceptions is the kind
of thing that no business person does without a strong economic incentive,
like business distress.
C. “Backdoor” Negotiations.
Staff attorneys within the OEMs are of course the organ that keeps the
tightest control on the boilerplate terms and guards against deviations. Other
organs—specifically, engineers and purchasing agents—may have slightly
divergent goals and motivations. The purchasing representatives are interested in the cost of the item and their performance is measured by their
success in getting the lowest price. Engineers are interested in quality and
uniqueness of features and operation and are less interested in cost. The engineering success is measured by how well the car works, the extent of
warranty obligation it causes and, of course, how well it sells. A timehonored but relatively crude way for a supplier to get better legal terms is to
convince the OEM engineers that the supplier’s part is the only acceptable
part and to get the engineer to write the specifications to exclude others. Or
one might get the engineers to agree to “engineering change orders” that
modify the specification of the part, enable the supplier to quote a new price
(without going through a competitive bidding process), and increase the
profit on the sale of the part. These ploys that result in higher prices offset
some of cost of unfavorable boilerplate.
77. Norihiko Shirouzu, Toyota Lobbies to Avoid Blame Amid U.S. Auto Industry Woes, Wall
St. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A2.
78. Jay Palmer, Taking on the World: Toyota’s Revving Up for a Bigger Chunk of the
Global Auto Market, Barron’s Online, May 5, 2003, available at http://www.logos4me.com/
Investment%20News/Taking%20on%20the%20World.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2005); Yuval
Rosenberg et al., The Top Picks from 50 Great Investors, Fortune, Dec. 29, 2003, at 70.
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More subtle indirect changes in the contract may also come in through
the engineers or by the addition of a term that the purchasing manager does
not regard as part of his “cost.” For example a supplier may negotiate for a
side agreement that permits the supplier to use the OEM’s tooling to make
aftermarket parts, a right that the boilerplate would deny. Since the supplier’s profit on the aftermarket parts may be substantial yet the purchasing
manager might not regard that as part of his “price,” the seller gets something of considerable value. One tier-1 representative spoke of the pricing
for service parts and change in the terms of the warranty process as examples of terms in the boilerplate that the OEMs might alter by a side
agreement if a successful pitch has been made to an organ within the OEM
who cares more about other factors. In these cases too, the base price stated
in the contract would not change but the change would have measurable and
predictable value for the supplier.
Conclusion
So there you have it—sophisticated companies use rigid boilerplate
forms to govern tens of billions of dollars of sales every year. The drafters of
these forms are not the least embarrassed in admitting that they draft every
term in a one-sided, self-serving manner. It turns out that such unrestrained
economic power in contracting is exercised not merely against the weak and
ill advised, but also against sophisticated partners to relational contracts.
And yet, in numerous discussions with suppliers and their representatives,
we have not heard the word “unconscionability” even once. Obviously, there
is no element of duress or unfair surprise in the formation of these contracts.
It is the understanding of all who are involved in this market that bargaining
power is the name of the game, and that the only way to reform the contracts
is to alter some fundamental features of this market to affect the division of
economic power.
Our study has obvious limitations. Since our primary interest was the
boilerplate contracts, the evidence we collected came from “legal”
sources—the contracts, the lawyers who draft them, the lawyers representing the parties to the purchase agreements, and the very small body of case
law. In the shadow of this legal cloud there may be a different business reality in which transactions occur in a more balanced way, and OEMs exercise
their power and their contractual entitlements in a selective and less selfish
manner. While we cannot rule out such a possibility, it does not seem plausible. Representatives of suppliers with whom we spoke exhibited too much
frustration with the OEMs’ legal terms; they appear to believe that the reality of the business is consistent with the picture portrayed by the boilerplate.
What are the lessons that can be drawn from this study? Unlike some
prior studies of automotive contracts, we do not claim any general conclusions about contractual behavior, nor do we aim any critique at the law or
advocate any legal reform. The automotive production business is sufficiently idiosyncratic that much of what we have learned may be applicable
only to this industry. For one, it is clear that much of the bargaining power
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account stems from the specific structure of the industry, in which specialized tier-1 companies are “captives”—they have immense investments in
production capacity and can sell only to a handful of clients. But this study
does show patterns that may have broader application. It identifies the important role that internal organization structures play in the formation of
form contracts. A story we all heard many times is that organizational concerns can explain the necessity of standard forms. That is, forms are a way
for principals to exert control over terms offered by their agents. But what
we found here was the flip side of this account. The internal hierarchy is not
the reason for the forms but rather an instrument in implementing the forms
as-is, without allowing any erosion of the terms. Constantly under pressure
by counterparties to vary some terms, buyers have erected artificial internal
structures to prevent purchasing agents from yielding to such pressures. This
internal rigidity also explains the absence of “menus”—the refusal of the
drafting party to set prices under which its counterparties can “buy” better
terms.
While some of our findings can be explained with clear economic logic,
for others we did not find a compelling explanation. We do not offer a satisfactory explanation for the variance of terms across the different OEM
contracts, or for the conjecture that some of these terms are inefficient. If we
are right in suggesting that there is inefficiency in the legal provisions, it is
possible—given the enormous stakes in this industry—that a lot of money is
left on the table. Clearly, the OEMs are using any means to reduce costs and
are pressuring their suppliers to the maximum extent. But by using such
harsh terms, the OEMs may be creating (or at least, not eliminating) the
deadweight loss. Another finding that left us puzzled is the IT forms; these
are a remarkable exception to the otherwise one-sided boilerplate in the industry. We can offer only guesses as to why IT firms succeed in securing
better terms. We leave this question for future inquiry.
Finally, this study reinforces some doubts about theories of asymmetric
information in contracting. We mentioned that a prominent line of thought
in economic theory identifies contractual failures as the reason for why
firms organize the way they do and why some activities are outsourced and
others are done in-house. Since auto production contracts have served an
important role in demonstrating these insights (the GM–Fisher Body story),
we took a closer look at the actual contracts. We discovered a reality in
which more things are “contractible” than previously suggested; where
asymmetric information and imperfect verification are rarely obstacles for
contracting; and where reputation sanctions quickly fill any void that the
contracts may have left. And yet, the familiar economic story of vertical
integration is not necessarily undermined. While it is not manifested through
outright takeover of supplier firms, we discovered that integration in production occurs in more subtle ways, such as contingent control over production
assets and technological innovations.

